This paper will relate the history and formation of the JFACC concept, review some inter-service doctrinal conflicts, and describe the current roles and responsibilities of a JFACC. The forthcoming analysis will illustrate benefits of the split JAOC structure when compared to a single air operations center in CONUS. The JFACC Forward/Rear concept ' The acronym JFACC stands for Joint Forces Air Component Commander and represents the person in command. It is also commonly used to represent the entire JFACC organization and staff (see Figure 1 ). The term AOC stands for Air Operation Center and represents the place where command and control functions occur. It is usually modified to become a Joint (JAOC) or Combined (CAOC) air operation center. This paper will use the term JAOC throughout and as commonly used, it also includes the people who perform the functions inside the JAOC. Explanations for abbreviations are located in Appendix A.
will be analyzed in the context of lessons learned from past operations. A corollary to the split JFACC (Forward/Rear) command arrangement is that the forward elements might be optimized aboard a naval vessel as a JFACC Afloat. The sea-based JAOC will be discussed at length and show that the Navy has a significant role in the command and control of joint air power. The goal is to provide guidance to future joint force commanders and their staffs in order to streamline the decision making process at the outset of hostilities.
This paper will analyze two basic questions that are closely linked: By analyzing historical lessons learned from actual air operations, in the framework of established military precepts for command and control, the answers to both questions above will be shown to be "yes". The first question is the most difficult, but the choice to split the air operations center will be proved a viable option. The "yes" answer to the question concerning the JFACC afloat will be derived after two false paradigms are dispelled.
Background
Since Operation Desert Storm and the introduction of the JFACC concept, the Response Package" (QRP Personal leadership during combat is also important in the prevention of friendly fire casualties. The fog of war is well known to military professionals. One report on Desert
Storm lists nine air-to-ground friendly fire engagements.17 Finding the means for deconflicting friendly fire might prove even more difficult if the JFACC is removed from combat and is located thousands of miles away from the ground component commander.
The ability of ground and air force commanders to speak directly, face-to-face, with personal knowledge of the arena in which the conflict is being waged is a necessity.
"If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well." (emphasis added) -Stonewall Jackson, Winchester, VA, November 1861.
Today's inventory dictates that short-range aircraft will conduct several of the required air missions. Probable mission types that will be based close to the front lines It is difficult to compare a JAOC's workload from one major air operation to another.
However, Figure 4 gives some examples of sortie rates and duration of combat operations as measurements to approximate the scope and effort required of JAOC staff functions. The Navy's inability to singly provide all the needs for a JFACC afloat is not the important issue, however, the issue that matters is this -can the Navy support a JFACC (usually an USAF officer with a large joint staff) from a ship? Especially if the JFC directs his air commander to be located in theater, closer to the combat, an option to base ashore may not exist. Just as the Navy supports the Marines by acting as a chauffer for the deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and also supports the Army and Air Force through prepositioning and strategic mobility shipping, the Navy can also be of valuable assistance to command and control of the air arm. The Navy can indeed support a JFACC, especially by embarking the forward portion of the JAOC. Differences in doctrine concerning command and control of air power exist in every service with an airplane. "If these issues are to be resolved at all, it is on the basis of either personal relationships among the senior commanders involved or by CINC direction."37 One valuable precedent of the Gulf War is that "the Navy has discovered that it must incorporate joint procedures and systems if it is to be effective against the enemy and competitive as a provider of tactical air services/8
Overall, JFACC doctrine is sound. The mode of air control between services that has worked best to date is for one service component commander to act as the lead commander and take tactical control of sorties from the committed assets of the other services. This obviously requires a joint JFACC staff, not just Air Force or Navy. Future armed conflicts may require unique and original C structures and systems. The disadvantages of a JFACC in CONUS reveal that the split JFACC is a valid and more flexible option of command and control because it combines the benefits of connectivity from CONUS assets with the advantages of a forward based commander -leadership.
